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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior research examining consumer expectations of equity and price fairness has not 
addressed wage fairness, as measured by a firm’s pay ratio. Pending legislation will 
require American public companies to disclose the pay ratio of CEO wage to the average 
employee’s wage. Our six studies show that pay ratio disclosure affects purchase 
intention of consumers via perceptions of wage fairness. The disclosure of a retailer’s 
high pay ratio (e.g., 1000 to 1) reduces purchase intention relative to firms with lower 
ratios (e.g., 5 to 1 or 60 to 1, Studies 1A, 1B, and 1C). Lower pay ratios improve 
consumer perceptions across a range of products at different price points (Study 2A and 
2B), increase consumer ratings of both firm warmth and firm competence (Study 3), and 
enhance perceptions of Democrats and Independents without alienating Republican 
consumers (Study 4). A firm with a high ratio must offer a 50% price discount to garner 
as favorable consumer impressions as a firm that charges full price but features a lower 
ratio (Study 5).  
 
 
Keywords: pay ratio, wage fairness, purchase intention, customers, financial disclosure 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On July 21, 2010, hours before the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act was 
signed into federal law, a last-minute addition was made to the 2300 page bill (Davidoff 
2013). The seven lines of Section 953(b) decreed that all public companies disclose the 
following in their annual reports and proxy statements: “A) the median of the annual total 
compensation of all employees of the issuer, except the chief executive officer (or any 
equivalent position) of the issuer; (B) the annual total compensation of the chief 
executive officer (or any equivalent position) of the issuer; and (C) the ratio of the 
amount described in subparagraph (A) to the amount described in subparagraph (B)” 
(“The Dodd-Frank Act” 2010).  Five years later, this section of the law has yet to be 
adopted as a formal rule by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC; Ross Sorkin 
2015). Should the law be implemented, what would the likely impact on consumer 
behavior be? And even in the absence of a legal requirement, could there be benefits for 
some firms in disclosing their (low) pay ratios to consumers? 
For obvious reasons, the pay ratio of CEOs to average workers has long been a 
question of interest to both employees and investors. Management guru Peter Drucker, 
for example, argued that the ratio of a CEOs salary to average worker salary should be 
capped at 25 to 1, and that greater disparity would lead to employee resentment and 
decreased morale, negatively affecting company performance (McGregor 2013). Yet a 
recent investigation conducted by the New York Times estimates that the pay ratio of total 
CEO compensation to median employee wage at a public company was as high as 2,238 
to 1 in 2014, unbeknownst to investors (Morgensen 2015). While pay ratios are of direct 
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material interest to investors and employees, we explore the effects of high pay ratios in a 
different context: the relationship between firms and customers.  
In fact, a “natural experiment” offers initial evidence that pay ratios are of interest 
not only to investors and employees, but also consumers. On October 13, 2013, the SEC 
posted a request for public comment on the proposed pay ratio disclosure rule; the SEC 
received over 126,000 public comments, which were classified into eight letter types and 
posted online (“Comments on Pay Ratio Disclosure” 2013). Comment Letter Type A, for 
instance, contained the following text: “Disclosing corporate pay ratios between CEOs 
and average employees will discourage the outrageous and reckless pay practices that 
fueled the 2008 crash. Knowing which corporations heap riches upon their executives 
while squeezing struggling employees also will be a useful factor for me when 
considering which businesses to support with my consumer and investment dollars.” 
Notably, this letter explicitly includes the term “consumer” in addition to the terms 
“investor” and “employee.” In fact, by our analysis, more than 25% of the comment 
letters used the term “consumer.”  
This motivates our prediction that consumer purchase behavior will be influenced 
by the disclosure of a firm’s pay ratio. Specifically, across six studies we test whether 
disclosing pay ratios of a retailer adversely affects customer attitudes and behaviors 
towards retailers with high ratios (e.g., 1000 to 1) compared to those with ratios they 
perceive to reflect fairer wages (e.g., 60 to 1). 
 
Pay Ratio Disclosure and Consumer Sentiment 
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But what is a “fair” wage ratio, that would induce positive consumer perceptions 
– or an “unfair” ratio that might induce negative perceptions? Previous research suggests 
that consumers believe CEO pays ratios are far lower than they actually are; in fact, 
consumers’ ideal ratio of CEO pay to average unskilled worker is 4.6 to 1, while their 
estimated actual ratio of CEO pay to average unskilled worker pay is 10 to 1 
(Kiatpongsan and Norton 2014). Note that this ideal ratio is far lower than the average 
pay ratio across US firms, which is estimated to be approximately 331 to 1 (AFL-CIO 
2014); indeed, one recent study uncovered large public firms with pay ratios ranging 
from 284 to 1 to 2239 to 1, when taking into account the value of base salary, cash 
bonuses, perquisites and the grant-date value of stock and option grants (Morgensen 
2015). Importantly, even seemingly similar firms can have dramatically different pay 
ratios: Walmart’s ratio, excluding stock compensation, has been estimated to be close to 
1000 to 1, whereas Costco comes in closer to 60 to 1 (Bach 2013; PayScale 2013).  
Given that prior work has established an ideal pay ratio far lower than the actual 
pay ratio of many large American firms, would consumers act differently towards firms 
with ratios closer to what they perceive to be fair? Certainly, previous research suggests 
that fairness can play a critical role in shaping consumer behavior. For instance, equity 
theory suggests that consumers desire an equitable distribution of profits between buyer 
and seller when interacting with a firm (Darke and Dahl 2003; Huppertz, Arenson, and 
Evans 2013). Moreover, when consumers believe that a firm is making a large profit on 
them, they perceive prices as less fair, and in turn are less willing to buy (Campbell 1999; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Xia, Monroe, and Cox 2004); in contrast, when 
prices are perceived to be more fair, firm perceptions are more positive (Bolton, Warlop, 
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and Alba 2003). A separate body of work has examined the effects of firm social 
responsibility relating to an ethical supply chain (Hiscox, Broukhim, and Litwin 2015; 
Kimeldorf, Meyer, and Robinson 2004; Paharia, Vohs, and Deshpandé 2013). For 
instance, consumers are willing to pay a 23% premium for coffee labeled ‘Fair Trade’ 
(Hiscox, Broukhim, and Litwin 2015). Given this general sensitivity to issues of fairness, 
we predict that when consumers are cued with a high pay ratio, their perception of the 
firm’s wage fairness will decrease, subsequently decreasing purchase intention.  
Of course, disclosing pay ratios is not without risks. First, it is plausible that the 
disclosure of a high pay ratio signals higher quality for certain product categories, 
signaling that a firm that has sufficient money to pay an astronomical CEO wage may 
also have the funds to devote to increased product quality – and therefore that goods 
made by firms with lower pay ratios may be perceived as of lower quality. Akin to the 
finding that chocolate fudge tastes better to consumers when they are told that it was 
produced using an expensive machine (Chinander and Schweitzer 2003), consumers may 
feel that products produced by firms with expensive CEOs are superior. To address this 
risk, we explore whether the effect of a retailer’s pay ratio disclosure on consumer 
intention to buy holds for a wide variety of products, and even for products whose quality 
is outside of that retailer’s purview – such as a gift certificate to a different retailer 
(Okada 2005). 
Second, it is possible that a low pay ratio may signal that a company is “warm and 
fuzzy” – but therefore not competent. Indeed, consumers are less willing to buy identical 
products made by non-profit versus for-profit firms, precisely because non-profits are 
seen as more ‘warm’ and less ‘competent’ (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010). Given the 
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perception of non-profit competence, it is plausible that a firm is seen as seen less 
‘competent’ if it pays its CEO a low wage. To address this risk, we assess this possible 
tradeoff between warmth and competence in the domain of pay ratios. Note that a firm 
with a low pay ratio could be seen as both warm (for treating its workers relatively well) 
and competent (for not over-compensating the CEO), such that firms with low pay ratios 
may not experience the same tradeoffs as non-profits. 
Third, it is possible that while disclosing low pay ratios improves perceptions of 
some consumers, it may alienate other consumers; in particular, liberal Americans are 
more likely to support increases in the minimum wage (and therefore lower pay ratios) 
than conservative Americans (Kuziemko et al. 2015). Given the central role that ideology 
plays in consumption (Crockett and Wallendorf 2004; Hirschman 1993) and the fact that 
different persuasive messages have different appeal to different political affiliations 
(Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty 2013; Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal 2012), it is possible 
that while low pay ratios may appeal to liberal consumers, they may serve as a deterrent 
to more conservative consumers. At the same time, both liberal and conservative 
Americans’ ideal pay ratios are far lower than current actual pay ratios (Kiatpongsan and 
Norton 2014), suggesting the possibility that low pay ratios may improve firm 
perceptions more broadly. 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
We examine when and why consumers reward or punish firms for their ratio of 
CEO pay to the pay of their average employee. In six experiments, participants answer 
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questions about shopping scenarios for different products.  We first examine whether 
disclosure of a high pay ratio versus a lower pay ratio leads to decreased willingness to 
buy and willingness to pay for products, whether shopping at only one retailer (Studies 
1A and 1B) or comparison shopping between high- and low-pay-ratio retailers (Study 
1C). We next assess these effects across hedonic and utilitarian goods, while controlling 
for possible inferences about different product types, different prices, and the quality of 
the retailer’s goods (Study 2A and 2B). We then explore whether disclosure of a low pay 
ratio positively increases consumer perception of firm warmth without sacrificing 
perceptions of firm competence (Study 3), and whether disclosure alienates certain 
consumer subgroups (Study 4). Finally, we explore the practical significance of these 
effects, assessing the percentage discount that high-pay-ratio retailers would need to offer 
in order to compete with low-pay-ratio retailers (Study 5). Across the studies, we assess 
perceptions of wage fairness in order to demonstrate a mediating role of wage fairness on 
consumer decisions. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for 
firms and policy makers, and possible future research directions.  
 
STUDY 1A: HIGH AND LOW (IDEAL) PAY RATIOS  
 
Study 1A offers an initial test of the effect of disclosing a “high” versus “low” 
pay ratio on consumer willingness to pay. Moreover, we assess perceptions of wage 
fairness to examine whether these perceptions track with pay ratios, and mediate the 
influence of ratios on purchase intentions. 
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Participants were given a description of a product (a towel set), and told the listed 
retail price for the towel. (A similar product sold online by a major American retailer 
informed the product description and retail price.) Between subjects, we varied pay ratio, 
by disclosing either a low (5 to 1) or high (1000 to 1) ratio of CEO compensation to 
median employee wage.  To estimate employee wage, CEO wage, and the resulting ratio 
for the high pay ratio, we used publicly available data, compiled by a firm that collects 
employee wage data at Fortune 100 firms (Bach 2013). Our high pay ratio ($24,000,000 
to $22,400, or 1000 to 1) reflects the estimated CEO cash compensation, median 
employee cash compensation, and resulting pay ratio of a large American retailer – 
Walmart, although participants were not informed of this fact (PayScale 2013). To create 
our low pay ratio, we held median employee pay constant at $22,400, and calculated the 
CEO salary to reflect the ideal pay ratio of a CEO’s wage to the average worker’s wage 
of approximately 5 to 1 demonstrated in previous research (Kiatpongsan and Norton 
2014).  
 
Method 
Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 406, Mage = 30.6, 65.8% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of 2 experimental conditions between subjects: “High ratio” (1000 to 1 
pay ratio) or “Low ratio” (5 to 1 pay ratio).   
All participants were provided with the following scenario: “Imagine that you are 
looking to purchase a new set of towels, to replace a worn out set you currently have. 
You find a set of 2 high-quality, 100% Turkish cotton towels. Each towel in the set is 
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oversized (34” by 68”).  The towel set has a listed retail price of $50.00, but sometimes 
goes on sale. A well-known general merchandise retailer, with both retail locations and 
an online store, sells the towels.” On the next page, in the high ratio condition, 
participants were told:  “You learn that the retailer pays the average employee $22,400. 
The retailer pays the CEO $24,000,000. The ratio of the CEO’s salary to the average 
employee’s salary is 1000 to 1.” In the low ratio condition, participants were told: “You 
learn that the retailer pays the average employee $22,400. The retailer pays the CEO 
$112,000. The ratio of the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 5 to 1.” 
Dependent Measures: Participants indicated their willingness to pay for the 
towels by indicating a dollar amount in response to an open-ended question: “What is the 
most you would be willing to pay for this towel set?” Participants also indicated their 
perception of wage fairness on a 7-point scale (1: Not at all fair, 7: Very fair): “How fair 
do you think the wages that this retailer pays its employees are?”   
All experiments concluded with demographic questions. Participants indicated 
their gender (male, female), age, highest level of education completed (some high school, 
high school graduate, some college, college graduate, postgraduate), and combined 
annual household income.  
We set the desired number of participants at the outset of each experiment and did 
not analyze the data until that number was reached. We report all manipulations and 
measures. In Experiment 1A, we excluded one participant who listed a willingness to pay 
above $240, since this was above the highest retail price ($120) we could find online for 
a single towel sold by a mainstream retailer.  
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Results 
Willingness to Pay. As predicted, willingness to pay for the product from the high 
ratio firm was significantly lower than from the low ratio firm (Mlow = 29.33, SD = 15.01  
vs. Mhigh = 25.51, SD = 13.51; t(403) = 2.67, p < 0.01). Gender, education, age, and 
income did not change this result when added to the model as covariates; including all 
four as covariates, for example, the effect of pay ratios remained significant, F(1, 399) = 
5.66, p = 0.02). Throughout the rest of our experiments all reported results remain 
substantively the same when controlling for these demographic variables (gender, 
education, age, and income). 
Wage Fairness. Also as predicted, perceived wage fairness was significantly 
lower for the firm with the high pay ratio than the firm with the low pay ratio (Mhigh = 
2.34, SD = 1.52 vs. Mlow = 3.77, SD = 1.67; t(403) = 9.03, p < 0.01).  
Mediation. The pay ratio condition predicted both willingness to pay (β = -3.83, p 
< 0.01), as well as wage fairness (β = -1.43, p < 0.01). When wage fairness and pay ratio 
condition were both included in the regression model predicting willingness to pay, the 
effect of wage fairness remained significant (β = 1.41, p < 0.01), and the effect of pay 
ratio condition was reduced to insignificance (β = -1.81, p = 0.24), providing support for 
mediation. A 5,000-sample bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% bias-corrected 
confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero [-5.05, -0.95], 
suggesting a significant indirect effect (Baron and Kenny 1986; Preacher and Hayes 
2008). 
 
STUDY 1B: HIGH AND LOW (REAL-WORLD) PAY RATIOS 
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Study 1A suggests that revealing that a firm pays its CEO an ‘ideal’ level of 
compensation relative to the average employee – a 5 to 1 ratio – leads to a higher 
willingness to pay for a towel than revealing an ‘unfair’ level of compensation (a 1000 to 
1 ratio). While a 5 to 1 ratio reflects people’s ideal ratio, an examination of pay ratios at 
Fortune 500 companies estimated the lowest pay ratio among retailers to be 
approximately 58 to 1 – at Costco (PayScale 2013). In Study 1B, we test whether 
revealing a real-world low pay ratio (60 to 1) increases willingness to buy relative to 
revealing another real-world, but much higher, pay ratio (1000 to 1). As in Study 1A, 
participants were presented with a product; in this study, however, participants were not 
given a focal retail price – rather, they were told that the product was priced reasonably, 
and rated their willingness to buy the product.  We varied the pay ratio: participants were 
randomized to see a product sold by a retailer with either a low (60 to 1) pay ratio or a 
high (1000 to 1) pay ratio. 
 
Method 
Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 156, Mage = 35.3, 64.7% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of 2 experimental conditions between subjects: “High ratio” (1000 to 1 
pay ratio) or a “Low ratio” (60 to 1 pay ratio).   
Participants were again told to envision a variation of the towel context used in 
Study 1A: “Imagine that you are looking to purchase a new set of towels, to replace a 
worn out set you currently have. You find a set of 2 high-quality, 100% Turkish cotton 
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towels. Each towel in the set is oversized (34” by 68”). You find a set of towels that you 
like, at a price point that is below your budget. A well-known general merchandise 
retailer, with both retail locations and an online store, sells the towels.” 
In the high ratio condition, participants were told:  “You learn that the retailer 
pays the average employee $22,400. The retailer pays the CEO $24,000,000. The ratio of 
the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 1000 to 1.”  In the low ratio 
condition, participants were told: “You learn that the retailer pays the average employee 
$22,400. The retailer pays the CEO $1,344,000. The ratio of the CEO’s salary to the 
average employee’s salary is 60 to 1.” 
Dependent Measures. To gauge willingness to buy, participants were asked: 
“Given the opportunity, how likely are you to purchase the towel set from this retailer?” 
on a 7-point scale (1: Not at all likely, 7: Very likely). Participants also indicated their 
perception of wage fairness on a 7-point scale (1: Not at all fair, 7: Very fair): “How fair 
do you think the wages that this retailer pays its employees are?”   
 
Results 
Willingness to Buy. Willingness to buy from the high-pay-ratio retailer was 
significantly lower than from the low-pay-ratio retailer (Mlow = 4.69, SD = 1.61 vs. Mhigh 
= 3.94, SD = 1.88; t(154) = 2.70, p < 0.01).  
Wage fairness. Perceived wage fairness was significantly lower in the high 
compared to the low pay ratio condition (Mlow = 3.51, SD = 1.72 vs. Mhigh = 2.29, SD = 
1.44; t(154) = 4.79, p < 0.01).  
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Mediation. Pay ratio condition predicted both willingness to buy (β = -0.76, p < 
0.01), as well as wage fairness (β = 1.22, p < 0.01). When wage fairness and pay ratio 
condition were both included in the regression model predicting willingness to pay, the 
effect of wage fairness remained significant (β = 0.61, p < 0.01), but the effect of pay 
ratio condition was reduced to insignificance (β = -0.02, p = 0.94), providing support for 
mediation. A 5,000-sample bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% bias-corrected 
confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero [-1.10, -0.42], 
suggesting a significant indirect effect (Baron and Kenny 1986; Preacher and Hayes 
2008). 
 
 
STUDY 1C: COMPARING HIGH- AND LOW-PAY-RATIO RETAILERS DIRECTLY 
 
Consumers in both Studies 1A and 1B considered only one retailer, but much 
real-world shopping involves comparing products across retailers. Coupled with the fact 
that consumers generally assess the value of products differently when assessing them 
jointly versus together (Hsee 1996), we designed Study 1C to provide a within-subjects 
test of the effects of pay ratios. Consumers evaluate two identical towels sold by two 
different retailers, as opposed to the separate evaluation in the prior studies. We examine 
when consumers are willing to pay a premium to purchase products sold by retailers with 
a low pay ratio.  
 
Method 
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 Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 101, Mage = 31.7, 60.4% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. Participants were told: “Imagine 
that you are looking to purchase a new set of towels, to replace a worn out set you 
currently have. You find a set of 2 high-quality, 100% Turkish cotton towels. Each towel 
in the set is oversized (34” by 68”). Two well-known general merchandise retailers sell 
the towel set. Retailer A pays the average employee $22,400, and the CEO $24,000,000 – 
the ratio of the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 1000 to 1. Retailer B 
pays the average employee $22,400 and the CEO $112,000 – the ratio of the CEO’s 
salary to the average employee’s salary is 5 to 1. Retailer A sells the set of towels for 
$25.00.” 
Dependent Measures. Participants were asked, “Would you be willing to pay 
more than $25 in order to buy the towels from Retailer B? (Yes/No).” Then, participants 
completed an open-ended question: “Please indicate the amount you’d be willing to pay 
to buy the towels from Retailer B.” Finally, participants indicated their perception of 
wage fairness on a 7-point scale (1: Not at all fair, 7: Very fair) for both retailers: “How 
fair do you think the wages that retailer [A/B] pays its employees are?” 
  
Results 
 Some 32.7% of participants stated that they would be willing to pay more than 
$25 in order to buy the towels from Retailer B. Replicating Study 1A, participants were 
willing to pay more to buy the towel from Retailer B than the retail price of $25.00 listed 
by Retailer A (MwtpB = 26.97, SD = 8.98; t(100) = 2.21, p = 0.03). Finally, participants 
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rated Retailer B as paying a fairer wage than Retailer A (MfairA = 2.97, SD = 1.85 vs. 
MfairB= 5.05 SD = 1.44; t(100) = 9.37, p < 0.01). 
 
STUDY 2A: PAY RATIOS ACROSS CATEGORY AND PRICE 
 
Studies 1A, 1B, and 1C demonstrate the benefits of low pay ratios on consumers’ 
willingness to pay and interest in purchasing, for one product type. In Studies 2A and 2B 
we investigate whether the positive effects hold across product types varying in price 
(Study 2A), and whether the effect holds when we control for inferences about product 
quality by standardizing retail value (Study 2B).  
Study 2A has two primary goals. First, we test whether the effect of disclosing a 
high pay ratio holds across different products and price points – ranging from a $3.99 box 
of cereal to a $499.99 flat screen television. Second, we also test whether the effect of 
disclosing a high pay ratio holds in the absence of revealing the specific CEO wage and 
employee wage paid out by the firm: do customers need to see the actual dollar amounts 
that CEOs make, or is merely viewing the ratio of CEO pay to employee pay sufficient to 
trigger reactions? 
 
Method 
Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 151, Mage = 30.2, 66.2% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. We used a 2(Pay Ratio: High vs. 
Low) by 10 (Product category: stereo headphones, 50” flat screen television, book, 16-
quart cooking pot, 80 pack of garbage bags, 5’ floor lamp, 21 oz. cereal box, 8 AA 
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battery pack, 2 bath towels, bag-less upright vacuum cleaner) mixed factorial design. All 
participants were told: “Imagine you are shopping at well-known general merchandise 
retailer, with both retail locations and an online store.” Pay ratio was again manipulated 
between subjects. In the high ratio condition, participants were told, “You learn that at 
this retailer, the ratio of the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 1000 to 1.” 
In the low ratio condition, participants were told, “You learn that at this retailer, the ratio 
of the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 5 to 1.” Each participant 
subsequently assessed their willingness to buy products from 10 different product 
categories. For each product, participants were told, “You come across [product], at a 
price that is below your budget.”  Each product was assessed on a separate page, and the 
10 products were presented in random order. The products represented a wide range of 
categories and prices: listed retail prices for similar products sold online ranged from 
$3.99 (cereal box) to $499.99 (flat screen television).  
Dependent Measures. Participants completed the same willingness to buy 
measure as in Study 1B. 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
Results 
Willingness to Buy. We conducted a 2(Pay Ratio: High vs. Low) by 10 (Product 
category: stereo headphones, 50” flat screen television, book, 16-quart cooking pot, 80 
pack of garbage bags, 5’ floor lamp, 21 oz. cereal box, 8 AA battery pack, 2 bath towels, 
bag-less upright vacuum cleaner) mixed ANOVA, with willingness to buy as the 
dependent variable. We first examined the between-subjects effects. We again found a 
significant main effect on willingness to buy of disclosing a high pay ratio (F(1,149) = 
	 18
5.43, p = 0.02). Examining the multivariate tests, we unsurprisingly found a significant 
within-subjects main effect of product category on willingness to buy (F(9,141) = 5.05, p 
< 0.01), denoting that some products were preferable to others. Importantly, the 
interaction between product type and pay ratio was not significant (F(9,141) = 0.66, p = 
0.75), indicating that the impact of pay ratio disclosure was not significantly different 
across product categories. As can be seen in Figure 1, for every product, the trend was 
such that willingness to buy was higher for the low-pay-ratio retailer. 
 
 
STUDY 2B: PAY RATIOS AND QUALITY INFERENCES 
 
In Study 2B we explore a potential downside of disclosing low pay ratios. 
Although consumers may believe that firms with high pay ratios have unfair wage 
structures, it is still possible that very high CEO compensation serves as a signal of 
product quality: if a firm can afford to pay its CEO $20 million dollars, it may also have 
the means to manufacture high quality products. (Of course, the opposite inference is also 
possible: firms that pay their CEOs too much may be taking money away from product 
quality). In Study 2, we control for variations in product quality by testing whether the 
impact of pay ratios holds for both hedonic and utilitarian goods with standardized retail 
value – gift certificates to another retailer (Okada 2005).   
Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 305, Mage = 30.0, 67.2% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. Participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of 4 experimental conditions in a 2 (Pay Ratio: High vs. Low) by 
2(Product Category: Hedonic vs. Utilitarian) between-subjects design.  
Participants were told to envision one of two shopping contexts, using a 
manipulation from prior research (Okada 2005). In the utilitarian context, participants 
were told: “Imagine that a well-known retailer sells a $50 grocery certificate to a 
supermarket that you frequent in your neighborhood.” In the hedonic context, participants 
were told: “Imagine that a well-known retailer sells a $50 dining certificate to a restaurant 
that you frequent in your neighborhood.” 
In the high ratio condition, participants were told:  “You learn that the retailer 
pays the average employee $22,400. The retailer pays the CEO $24,000,000. The ratio of 
the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 1000 to 1.” In the low ratio 
condition, participants were told: “You learn that the retailer pays the average employee 
$22,400. The retailer pays the CEO $112,000. The ratio of the CEO’s salary to the 
average employee’s salary is 5 to 1.” 
Dependent Measures. Participants then completed the same willingness to buy 
and wage fairness measures as in Study 1B. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 About Here] 
 
RESULTS 
Willingness to Buy. We conducted a 2(Pay Ratio: High vs. Low) by 2(Purchase 
Context: Hedonic vs. Utilitarian) ANOVA on willingness to buy (Figure 2). We again 
observed a significant effect of pay ratios (F(1,301) = 71.15, p < 0.01). There was no 
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main effect of purchase context (F(1,301) = 0.03, p = 0.92), and the interaction between 
ratio discrepancy and purchase context was not significant (F(1,301) = 0.39, p = 0.53), 
such that the effect of ratios on preferences held for both hedonic and utilitarian gift 
cards.  
Wage Fairness. We conducted a 2(Pay Ratio: High vs. Low) by 2(Purchase 
Context: Hedonic vs. Utilitarian) ANOVA on perceptions of wage fairness. There was 
again a main effect of ratio discrepancy (F(1,301) = 120.66, p < 0.01). There was no 
main effect of purchase context (F(1,301) = 0.76, p = 0.38), and the interaction between 
ratio discrepancy and purchase context was not significant (F(1,301) = 1.41, p = 0.24).  
Mediation. Once again, pay ratio condition predicted both willingness to buy (β = 
-1.64, p < 0.01), as well as wage fairness (β = -2.23, p < 0.01). When wage fairness and 
pay ratio condition were both included in the regression model predicting willingness to 
pay, the effect of wage fairness remained significant (β = 0.58, p < 0.01), but the effect of 
pay ratio condition was reduced to insignificance (β = -0.34, p = 0.14), again providing 
support for mediation. A 5,000-sample bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% bias-
corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero [-1.47, -
0.90], suggesting a significant indirect effect (Baron and Kenny 1986; Preacher and 
Hayes 2008). 
 
STUDY 3: PAY RATIOS, WARMTH, AND COMPETENCE 
 
 Study 2 demonstrates that the effects of disclosing a high pay ratio on consumer 
purchase intention occurs even when product quality is held constant, suggesting that 
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independent of product quality inferences, low-pay-ratio retailers are preferred. In Study 
3, we explore a potential second risk for firms that disclose a low pay ratio. Prior research 
shows that consumers assess firms across the dimensions of warmth and competence, 
with non-profits typically viewed as warm (but incompetent) and for-profits typically 
viewed as competent (but cold; (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010)). In Study 3, we test 
whether disclosing a low pay ratio leads to similar tradeoffs in perceptions of firm 
warmth versus firm competence – whether being fair leads to perceptions of being nice, 
but incompetent. 
 
Method 
Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 402, Mage = 31.5, 66.8% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. Participants were once again 
randomly assigned to one of 2 experimental conditions between subjects: “High ratio” 
(1000 to 1 pay ratio) or a “Low ratio” (5 to 1 pay ratio).  The experimental design was 
identical to Study 1A.  
Dependent Measures. The willingness to pay and wage fairness measures were 
administered as in Study 1A. We excluded one outlier participant, who stated a 
willingness to pay above $240.  
In addition, we included measures to gauge perceptions of firm warmth and 
perceptions of firm competence (Aaker, Vohs, and Mogilner 2010). Participants were 
asked, “To what extent do you believe that this retailer is ____?” on a set of 6 traits, 
presented in randomized order. We summed and averaged the participants’ responses to 
create two indexes. Three traits comprised the warmth index (warm, kind, generous; 
	 22
Cronbach’s α = 0.93) and three traits comprised the competence index (competent, 
effective, efficient; Cronbach’s α = 0.88).  
 
Results 
Willingness to Pay. Replicating our prior studies, willingness to pay in the high 
ratio condition was significantly lower than in the low ratio condition (Mhigh = 25.84, SD 
= 13.27 vs. Mlow = 28.83, SD = 12.79; t(399) = 2.28, p = 0.02).  
Wage Fairness. Perceived wage fairness was significantly lower in the high ratio 
condition than in the low ratio condition (Mhigh = 2.65, SD = 1.61 vs. Mlow = 3.64 SD = 
1.78; t(399) = 5.96, p < 0.01).  
Retailer Warmth and Competence. Most importantly for the current study, we 
observed no tradeoff between warmth and competence for low-pay-ratio retailers. 
Perceived retailer warmth was significantly lower in the high ratio condition than in the 
low ratio condition (Mhigh = 2.76 SD = 1.35 vs. Mlow = 3.66, SD = 1.41; t(399) = 6.57, p < 
0.01), as was perceived retailer competence (Mhigh = 4.25, SD = 1.38 vs. Mlow = 4.66 SD 
= 1.20; t(399) = 3.10, p < 0.01).  
Mediation. Once again, the pay ratio condition predicted both willingness to pay 
(β = -2.99, p = 0.02) and wage fairness (β = -0.99, p < 0.01). When wage fairness and pay 
ratio condition were both included in the regression model predicting willingness to pay, 
the effect of wage fairness remained significant (β = 1.65, p < 0.01), but the effect of pay 
ratio condition was reduced to insignificance (β = -1.36, p = 0.31), again providing 
support for mediation. A 5,000-sample bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% bias-
corrected confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero [-2.58, -
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0.60], suggesting a significant indirect effect (Baron and Kenny 1986; Preacher and 
Hayes 2008). 
 
STUDY 4: PAY RATIOS AND POLITICAL BELIEFS 
 
Study 3 demonstrates that disclosing a low pay ratio does not lead to tradeoffs in 
perceptions of firm warmth versus firm competence. In Study 4, we explore a third 
potential risk for firms that disclose a low pay ratio. Prior research shows that people 
have varying perceptions of inequality; for instance, Republican voters desire relatively 
less equal distributions of wealth than their Democratic counterparts (Norton and Ariely 
2011). In Study 4, we test whether a low pay ratio will alienate certain customer 
subgroups, such that even if disclosure increases positive perceptions of some customers, 
it may harm the firm in the eyes of other customers. 
 
Method 
Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 253, Mage = 33.5, 57.7% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. We again varied the pay ratio: 
participants were randomized to see a product sold by a retailer with either a low (5 to 1) 
pay ratio or a high (2000 to 1) pay ratio. 
Participants were again told to envision a variation of the towel context used in 
Study 1B, with the identical focal product description. In the high ratio condition, 
participants were told:  “You learn that the retailer pays the average employee $22,400. 
The retailer pays the CEO $48,000,000. The ratio of the CEO’s salary to the average 
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employee’s salary is 2000 to 1.”  In the low ratio condition, participants were told: “You 
learn that the retailer pays the average employee $22,400. The retailer pays the CEO 
$112,000. The ratio of the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 5 to 1.” 
Dependent Measures. Participants then completed the same willingness to buy 
and wage fairness measures as in Study 1B. In addition, participants were asked to report 
their political party from four choices (Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other). 
Finally, as a secondary measure, participants stated their positions regarding inequality: 
“Differences in income in the United States are too large (strongly agree, agree, neither 
agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree)” (“International Social Survey 
Programme” 2009). 
 
Results 
Willingness to Buy. Willingness to buy from the high-pay-ratio retailer was again 
significantly lower than from the low-pay-ratio retailer (Mlow = 5.22, SD = 1.53 vs. Mhigh 
= 4.17, SD = 1.89; t(251) = 4.84, p < 0.01).  
 
[Insert Figure 3 About here] 
 
Political Beliefs. Of the participants, 18.6% identified as Republican, 44.3% 
identified as Democrat, 32.8% identified as Independent, and 4.3% identified as “Other.” 
In three of the four subgroups by political affiliation (Democrat, Independent, Other) 
there were significant differences in willingness to buy between the high-pay-ratio and 
the low-pay-ratio retailer, with participants more willing to buy in the high-pay-ratio 
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condition (p’s < 0.02; Figure 3). In the Republican subgroup, there was no significant 
difference in willingness to buy between the high-pay-ratio and the low-pay-ratio retailer 
(Mlow = 5.36, SD = 1.32 vs. Mhigh = 5.36, SD = 1.68; t(45) = -0.01, p = 0.99). 
Beliefs about Inequality. When participants were asked if differences in income in 
the United States are too large, 38.7% indicated “strongly agree,” 39.9% indicated 
“agree,” 10.7% indicated “neither agree nor disagree,” 7.9% indicated “disagree,” and 
2.4% indicated “strongly disagree.” We conducted a 2 condition (Low Ratio, High Ratio) 
ANOVA on willingness to buy, including perceived differences in income as a covariate. 
There were main effects of condition (F(1,248) = 23.34, p < 0.01) and perceived 
difference in income (F(1,248) = 22.85, p < 0.01), and a significant interaction (F(1,248) 
= 8.59, p < 0.01). Participants who strongly agreed or agreed reported greater willingness 
to buy from low-pay-ratio retailer (p’s < 0.01); participants who neither agreed nor 
disagreed, disagreed, or strongly disagreed reported no difference in willingness to buy 
(p’s > 0.05). 
Wage fairness. Perceived wage fairness was significantly lower in the high 
compared to the low pay ratio condition (Mlow = 3.83, SD = 1.80 vs. Mhigh = 2.37, SD = 
1.58; t(251) = 6.82, p < 0.01).  
Mediation. Pay ratio condition predicted both willingness to buy (β = -1.05 p < 
0.01), as well as wage fairness (β = -1.45, p < 0.01). When wage fairness and pay ratio 
condition were both included in the regression model predicting willingness to pay, the 
effect of wage fairness remained significant (β = 0.52, p < 0.01), but the effect of pay 
ratio condition was reduced to insignificance (β = -0.29, p = 0.15), providing support for 
mediation. A 5,000-sample bootstrap analysis revealed that the 95% bias-corrected 
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confidence interval for the size of the indirect effect excluded zero [-1.03, -0.52], 
suggesting a significant indirect effect (Baron and Kenny 1986; Preacher and Hayes 
2008). 
 
STUDY 5: BENCHMARKING THE BENEFITS OF LOW PAY RATIOS 
 
Study 4 shows that Democrats and Independents respond positively to the 
disclosure of a low pay ratio, while Republicans are indifferent, providing evidence that 
the strategy increases positive perceptions of most customers without harming 
perceptions of other customers. In Study 5, we examine whether decreasing a good’s 
retail price by placing the item on sale counterbalances the negative effects of revealing a 
high pay ratio. Study 1C suggested that a portion of consumers are willing to pay a price 
premium for a good carried by a firm with a low pay ratio, even if a competitor sells the 
good at a lower price. Thus, in Study 5, we assess whether the impact of high versus low 
pay ratios on purchase intention remains when consumers are offered increasingly 
attractive price discounts.  
 
Method 
Design and Procedure. Participants (N = 375, Mage = 33.4, 57.2% male) 
completed this online experiment in exchange for $0.30. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of 5 experimental conditions between subjects (Low Ratio, High Ratio, 
High Ratio + 10% discount, High Ratio + 25% discount, High Ratio + 50% discount). 
	 27
Participants were again told to envision a variation of the towel context used in 
Study 1A, with the identical focal product description. In the low ratio condition, 
participants were told: “You learn that the retailer pays the average employee $22,400. 
The retailer pays the CEO $112,000. The ratio of the CEO’s salary to the average 
employee’s salary is 5 to 1.”  
In the high ratio condition, participants were told:  “You learn that the retailer 
pays the average employee $22,400. The retailer pays the CEO $24,000,000. The ratio of 
the CEO’s salary to the average employee’s salary is 1000 to 1.”  In the three new high 
pay ratio conditions, participants were told: “The towel is on sale for 
($45.00/$37.50/$25.00).” (These prices represent discounts of 10%, 25%, and 50% 
respectively.)  
Dependent Measures. Participants indicated their willingness to buy the towels 
and their perception of wage fairness using the same items from Study 1B.   
 
[Insert Figure 4 About here] 
Results 
Willingness to Buy. We conducted a 5 condition (Low Ratio, High Ratio, High 
Ratio + 10% discount, High Ratio + 25% discount, High Ratio + 50% discount) ANOVA 
on willingness to buy (Figure 4). There was a main effect of condition (F(4,371) = 6.41, p 
< 0.01). We subsequently compared the various “high ratio” conditions to the “low ratio” 
conditions. Consistent with previous experiments, willingness to buy was significantly 
higher when a 5 to 1 CEO pay ratio was disclosed versus a 1000 to 1 CEO pay ratio (Mlow 
= 4.39, SD = 1.80 vs. Mhigh = 3.25 SD = 1.83; t(147) = 3.80, p < 0.01). Willingness to 
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buy remained significantly higher in the low-pay-ratio condition compared to a high-pay-
ratio retailer who offered a 10% price discount (Mlow = 4.39, SD = 1.80  vs. Mhigh + 10% off 
= 3.01 SD = 1.94; t(151) = 4.53, p < 0.01), and even a high-pay-ratio retailer who offered 
a 25% price discount (Mlow = 4.39, SD = 1.80  vs. Mhigh + 25% off = 3.69 SD = 1.98; t(151) 
= 2.26, p < 0.05). Only when offering a 50% price discount did a high-pay-ratio retailer 
elicit similar willingness to buy as the low-pay-ratio retailer (Mlow = 4.39, SD = 1.80 vs. 
Mhigh + 50% off = 4.02 SD = 2.02; t(153) = 1.17, p = 0.25).   
Wage Fairness. We conducted a 5 condition (Low Ratio, High Ratio, High Ratio 
+ 10% discount, High Ratio + 25% discount, High Ratio + 50% discount) ANOVA on 
perceptions of wage fairness. There was a main effect of condition (F(4,371) = 11.16, p < 
0.01). We subsequently compared the various high ratio conditions to the low ratio 
condition. Wage fairness was significantly higher for low-pay-ratio retailers than high-
pay-ratio retailers, and this pattern held true regardless of which discount was offered (all 
p’s < 0.01); even when a high pay ratio was coupled with a 50% price discount, 
participants continued to rate the firm as having less fair wages (Mlow = 3.63, SD = 1.87 
vs. Mhigh + 50% off  = 2.46 SD = 1.46; t(153) = 4.35, p < 0.01). 
Study 4 suggests that the capacity for low pay ratios to boost willingness to buy 
persists even if a product is offered at up to a 25% discount. Even at a 50% discount, 
consumers are not significantly more willing to purchase a product sold by a retailer with 
a high pay ratio than from a retailer with low pay ratio – but no discount at all. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
	 29
We opened by noting that Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act decreed that all 
public companies disclose the ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of the 
median employee. We examined the impact of such disclosures on consumer behavior. 
Six experiments demonstrated that the disclosure of a firm’s pay ratio can influence 
consumer purchase intention. The disclosure of a high pay ratio versus a low pay ratio 
leads to decreased willingness to buy and willingness to pay for a good (Studies 1A, 1B, 
and 1C). These effects hold across different product categories and price ranges (Studies 
2A and 2B). Relative to a high pay ratio, the disclosure of a low pay ratio positively 
increases consumer perceptions of firm warmth without sacrificing perceptions of firm 
competence (Study 3). Moreover, the disclosure of a low pay ratio versus a high pay ratio 
improves perceptions of most consumers without alienating any customer subgroups by 
political affiliation (Study 4). The negative effect of a high pay ratio persists in the 
presence of a price discount of up to 25%, and only diminishes (but does not reverse) at a 
50% price discount (Study 5). Across our studies, we find that perceptions of wage 
fairness mediate the effect of revealing pay ratio consumer purchase decisions. 
Prior research examining consumer expectations of equity and price fairness has 
not addressed wage fairness, and whether consumers care about the distribution of wages 
a firm pays its employees – thus, our results contribute to both these streams of literature 
(Darke and Dahl 2003; Xia et al. 2004). Our results also contribute to a broader literature 
on the benefits of firm transparency – of firms literally showing consumers what happens 
behind the scenes (Buell and Norton 2011; Chinander and Schweitzer 2003). In Buell and 
Norton (2011), for example, consumers preferred websites that “revealed” the process by 
which they searched for results – in one study, revealing the process through which it 
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looked for potential dates for online dating users. At the same time, however, not all 
disclosure proves to be beneficial: when websites reveal their processes only to suggest 
poor options (say, an unattractive date), consumers react more negatively. Despite the 
differences between dating and compensation, our results also suggest that pay disclosure 
can have benefits: firms with low pay ratios stand to garner improved consumer 
perceptions via disclosure relative to firms with very high ratios. 
We note that, because pay ratio disclosure is currently not required of public 
companies, the estimated pay ratios informing our experiments are based on data – often 
self-reported – collected by third parties like Payscale (e.g., Bach 2013). Actual ratios can 
vary significantly on the basis of underlying assumptions when calculating both the 
numerator and denominator. For instance, pay ratios vary depending on whether the 
definition of “CEO compensation” includes stock grants, or only cash. In addition, “total 
compensation” might not include other benefits such as healthcare. We do not explicitly 
differentiate between cash and stock compensation in our studies. At the extreme end, 
Google’s CEO Larry Page receives annual cash compensation of $1, and has not received 
a stock grant in the past few years, resulting in a pay ratio that is effectively zero, 
regardless of employee wages (“Google Inc.” 2015). We do not test these extreme cases 
in our research, but future research should explore consumer perceptions when CEOs 
appear to be trying to “dodge” disclosure by shifting their compensation toward 
categories that are immune from disclosure.  
Given our results, it is plausible that other types of disclosures that signal wage 
unfairness could also affect consumer purchase intentions. One possible context for 
further exploration is gender inequality in wages within a company. Unlike pay ratio 
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disclosure, there is no pending legislation requiring companies to disclose whether men 
and women doing the same job within a firm are receiving equal pay. However, in 2014, 
the ratio of women’s to men’s median weekly full-time earnings was 82.5 percent 
(Hegewisch, Ellis, and Hartmann 2015). While some statistics comparing salaries by 
gender at the firm level are available, they are both limited and self-reported (Glassdoor 
2014). In 2014, Sony Pictures was hacked, and confidential internal data was made 
public; among other salacious findings, it was discovered that a female executive made 
65% of the salary of a male executive with the same title and position (Roose 2014). If 
such information was representative of the gender wage gap within the whole firm, would 
consumers care? Thus, future research could further explore the repercussions of ratio 
disclosure on consumer behavior in other wage-related contexts.  
 
Conclusion 
Critics of the pay ratio disclosure law have argued that the costs of calculating the 
required pay ratios outweigh the economic benefits of disclosure to investors (Ross 
Sorkin 2015): in an open letter urging the SEC to reconsider the pay ratio rule, 
representatives from 33 public companies stated: “We want to emphasize our collective 
view that the cost of this disclosure far outweighs any benefit to the investment 
community” (Nelson et al. 2013). Proponents of pay ratio disclosure, in contrast, 
emphasize the material benefits to investors: in an open letter urging the SEC to finalize 
the pay ratio disclosure rule, 58 members of Congress noted that, “Boards of directors, 
investors, and other stakeholders need this information to better understand and assess 
CEO compensation” (Ellison et al. 2015). Our results demonstrate an additional impact 
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that has not been widely discussed: consumers are likely to be influenced by pay ratio 
disclosure. Even if pay ratio disclosure does not become legally mandated, our results 
suggest that firms with (low) pay ratios relative to competitors may wish to begin to 
disclose this information voluntarily, as a means of garnering favorable consumer 
perceptions.  
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Figure 1. Consumers are more willing to buy a wide range of products from retailers with 
low pay ratios (Study 2A). 
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Figure 2. Consumers are more willing to buy gift cards for both hedonic and utilitarian 
goods from retailers with low pay ratios (Study 2B). 
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Figure 3. Most consumer subgroups, by political party, are more willing to buy from 
retailers with low pay ratios (Study 4).  
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Figure 4. Firms with high pay ratios must offer a 50% discount in order for consumers to 
be as willing to buy from them as from a retailer with a low wage ratio (Study 5).  
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